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Three Theories of “Principles of 
Fundamental Justice” 
Nader R. Hasan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
No section of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 has 
generated more controversy than section 7. The open-textured rights 
protected under section 7 — “life, liberty and security of the person” — 
and their equally open-ended qualifier — the “principles of fundamental 
justice” — have been a source of both optimism and confusion for litigants 
and scholars alike.2 Even justices of the Supreme Court of Canada have 
candidly admitted that the ambit of section 7 “remains difficult to 
foresee”.3 
                                                                                                             
*  The author is a partner at Ruby Shiller Chan Hasan, Barristers and an adjunct professor 
at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. The author thanks Brendan Brammall, Jamie Cameron, 
Gerald Chan and Penelope Ng for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of 
this article. The author also thanks Cheryl McKinnon for her research assistance. 
1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11, s. 7 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2  See, e.g., Randal N.M. Graham, “Right Theory, Wrong Reasons: Dynamic Interpretation, 
the Charter and ‘Fundamental Laws’” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 169 (examining the interpretive 
theory used by courts in s. 7 cases); David Mullan, “Section 7 and Administrative Law Deference — 
No Room at the Inn?” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 227 (critiquing the Supreme Court’s denial of the 
relevance of administrative law principles to constitutional adjudication); Jamie Cameron, “Fault and 
Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 553 [hereinafter 
“Cameron”] (noting that the s. 7 jurisprudence “has become such an unwholesome jumble of tests 
and doctrines”); Alana Klein, “Section 7 of the Charter and the Principled Assignment of Legislative 
Jurisdiction” (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 59 [hereinafter “Klein”] (urging an approach to s. 7 that 
accounts for the respective institutional roles of courts and legislatures). 
3  Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 
2 S.C.R. 307, at para. 188 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Blencoe”]. 
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While the scope of the rights to “life, liberty and security of the person” 
is far from settled,4 the principles of fundamental justice have proven to be 
the more elusive concept.5 In the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference,6 Lamer J. 
began the Court’s ambitious project of giving life to the “principles of 
fundamental justice” in a manner that was consistent with the Charter’s 
transformative purpose. He eschewed the legislative history and originalist 
doctrine, which supported a definition of fundamental justice that was 
limited to procedural due process. He stressed that Canada had made a 
democratic decision to give the courts more power, including the power of 
constitutional judicial review.7 For the newly planted Charter to fulfil its 
transformative purpose, section 7 must encompass both procedural and 
substantive principles of fundamental justice.8  
Justice Lamer went on to provide some guidance on section 7’s 
qualifier — the “principles of fundamental justice”. The principles of 
fundamental justice were to be section 7’s workhorse. Without that 
qualifier, section 7 would guarantee an absolute right to be free from 
government interference with life, liberty or security of the person. Justice 
Lamer held that the principles of fundamental justice were “to be found in 
the basic tenets of our legal system”.9 He did not, however, go on to define 
the principles of fundamental justice. Nor did he tie the principles of 
fundamental justice to any particular theory or judicial philosophy.  
Justice Lamer’s ambitious vision for the principles of fundamental 
justice provided an important building block for some of the most impor-
tant and controversial decisions since the Charter’s adoption, including 
the invalidation of Canada’s abortion scheme;10 the elimination of felony 
                                                                                                             
4  See, e.g., Alan Young, “Deprivations of Liberty: The Impact of the Charter on 
Substantive Criminal Law” (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 73 (addressing whether the “right to liberty” in 
s. 7 protects fundamental personal choices from state interference). 
5  See, e.g., Mark Carter, “Fundamental Justice in Section 7 of the Charter: A Human Rights 
Interpretation” (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 243 (urging courts to adopt an understanding of “fundamental 
justice” consistent with human rights theory); Peter W. Hogg, “The Brilliant Career of Section 7 of the 
Charter” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 195 (overview of the history of s. 7) [hereinafter “Hogg”]. 
6  Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486, at 501-504 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “MVR”]. 
7  Id., at 498-500. 
8  Id., at 499 (noting that the Court’s task “is not to choose between substantive or 
procedural content per se but to secure for persons ‘the full benefit of the Charter’s protection’ under 
s. 7, while avoiding adjudication of the merits of public policy”) (citations omitted). 
9  Id., at 503. 
10  R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Morgentaler”]. 
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murder provisions of the Criminal Code;11 and the nullification of the 
federal government’s decision to cancel a safe drug injection site.12 
But in opening the section 7 principles of fundamental justice to 
substantive judicial review, Lamer J. appeared to give little thought to 
how Pandora’s Box might be closed. If the principles of fundamental 
justice were to include substantive principles, what would be section 7’s 
limits? How would these unwritten principles of fundamental justice be 
identified? What purposes and principles should guide courts when they 
are asked to recognize new principles of fundamental justice? Would 
Canadian section 7 jurisprudence forever be mired in a U.S.-style debate 
about the legitimacy of “substantive due process”?13 
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has grappled with 
these questions, and at various points, has adopted “frameworks” and 
“tests” to limit the principles of fundamental justice. But it has never 
identified a theory to explain the principles of fundamental justice. 
Nevertheless, there is a sufficient body of jurisprudence to enable us to 
identify three complementary (but conceptually distinct) theories, which 
emerge implicitly from Supreme Court of Canada case law.  
The first theory is historical: a principle of fundamental justice is a 
legal principle that was historically protected or is deeply rooted in our 
legal system’s history and traditions. The courts will recognize a 
principle of fundamental justice if it can be anchored in a common law 
legal principle or in norms enshrined in the post-Second World War 
international human rights instruments that inspired the Charter’s 
framers. Under this theory, the principal purpose of the section 7 
principles of fundamental justice is to ensure that rights and principles do 
not lose their protected status merely because they were not specifically 
enumerated in the text of the Charter.  
The second theory is derivative: it posits that the principles of 
fundamental justice are to be found in the penumbra of section 7 and the 
other “Legal Rights” protected under sections 8 to 14 of the Charter. This 
theory recognizes that for the Charter to fulfil its transformative purpose, 
                                                                                                             
11  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. See R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). 
12  Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”]. 
13  See Ryan C. Williams, “The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause” (2010) 
120 Yale L.J. 408; John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), at 18 (“[W]e apparently need periodic reminding 
that ‘substantive due process’ is a contradiction in terms — sort of like ‘green, pastel redness.’”). 
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rights must not be frozen in 1982. Section 7 and sections 8 to 14 form an 
interconnected web of rights, which are mutually reinforcing. A legal 
principle is a principle of fundamental justice if it is necessary to give 
meaning and effect to the other principles of fundamental justice in 
sections 7 to 14 of the Charter. Under this theory, the principles of 
fundamental justice serve to fill in the gaps left by the enumerated 
principles of fundamental justice contained in sections 8 to 14 of the 
Charter and the historically entrenched section 7 principles of fundamental 
justice that have been “grandfathered” into section 7 by virtue of their pre-
Charter status. 
The third theory is evolutionary: even where a principle was neither 
historically protected nor found within the penumbras of sections 7 to 14 
of the Charter, the Court may recognize a principle of fundamental 
justice where the right to life, liberty or security of the person outweighs 
a competing governmental interest. Respect for human dignity and 
autonomy are the animating principles. Under this theory, the principles 
of fundamental justice protect an evolving set of national values that 
command widespread contemporary support. Like the penumbra theory, 
this category also recognizes that rights must not be frozen in 1982, but it 
is broader and potentially more indeterminate. The courts have dealt with 
this potential indeterminacy by creating “frameworks” and “tests” meant 
to limit the ambit of the section 7 principles of fundamental justice. 
Owing in part to these cumbersome tests, this third category over time 
has coalesced around three principles of fundamental justice grounded in 
the concept of proportionality — arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality. 
These three theories of the principles of fundamental justice embody 
variants of the Charter’s transformative purpose. Although none of the 
three theories described in this paper can alone account for all of the 
principles of fundamental justice that have been recognized since MVR, 
together they account for most (if not all) of the disparate approaches to 
the principles of fundamental justice in Supreme Court of Canada case 
law. The seeds of all three theories can be found in MVR, but each has 
developed separately. 
The Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed any of these 
theories. They emerge only implicitly from the case law. The goal of this 
paper is to render them explicit. This exercise is not merely academic. 
By attempting to illuminate the reasoning behind these decisions, I hope 
to identify lessons for future litigants seeking to assert their section 7 
Charter rights.  
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II. THE THREE THEORIES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
1.  The Historical Principles of Fundamental Justice 
In MVR, Lamer J. noted that the principles of fundamental justice 
“are to be found in the basic tenets of our legal system”.14 The “basic 
tenets” are not defined, but Lamer J. wrote that many of these principles 
of fundamental justice “have been developed over time as presumptions 
at common law, [while] others have found expression in the international 
conventions on human rights”.15 This language suggests that courts ought 
to recognize a principle of fundamental justice if that principle was 
previously acknowledged as fundamental to our legal system in the pre-
Charter era. This theory of the principles of fundamental justice looks to 
the past.  
The historical approach posits that the principles of fundamental jus-
tice fulfil an overarching purpose of the Charter by ensuring that rights 
and principles do not lose their protected status merely because they 
were not specifically enumerated in the text of the Charter. At its broad-
est level, the purpose of the Charter was to transform Canada into a 
constitutional democracy in which Government was constrained not only 
by institutional structures, but also by the human and civil rights belong-
ing to the people.16 Prior to the Charter’s adoption, individual rights and 
liberties in Canada had been protected primarily under the common law. 
But the common law is subservient to the will of the legislature, which 
can narrow or altogether eliminate common law rights. Even a statutory 
bill of rights lacks the gravitas and force of law to supplant the will of 
the legislature, as our experience with the Canadian Bill of Rights 
showed. 17 By contrast, a constitutional bill of rights “withdraw[s] certain 
                                                                                                             
14  MVR, supra, note 6, at 503. 
15  Id. 
16  See Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The Canadian Charter’s Transformative Aspirations” (2003) 
19 S.C.L.R. (3d) 17, at 17-19; Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The Postwar Paradigm and American 
Exceptionalism” in Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 84; John D. Whyte, “The Charter at 30: A Reflection” (2012) 
17 Rev. Const. Stud. 1, at 2. 
17  Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III. For 
examples of the ineffectiveness of the Bill of Rights, see, e.g., Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[1978] S.C.J. No. 81, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 (S.C.C.) (holding that the equality clause of the Bill of 
Rights was not violated by the denial of benefits to women under the Unemployment Insurance Act 
during pregnancy); Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1973] S.C.J. No. 128, [1974] S.C.R. 1349 
(S.C.C.) (holding that provisions of the Indian Act that deprived Aboriginal women (but not 
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subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy” and “place[s] 
them beyond the reach of majorities”.18 Rights protected under the com-
mon law or statute are ephemeral; rights protected by a constitutionally 
entrenched bill of rights are guaranteed. 
The section 7 principles of fundamental justice are essential to the 
Charter’s transformative purpose. A constitutional bill of rights like the 
Charter involves the enumeration of specific rights. But a danger arises if 
those specifically mentioned rights are taken as exhaustive instead of 
illustrative. By enumerating rights in a constitutional bill of rights, we 
risk obscuring or altogether eliminating those rights that existed at com-
mon law and thus stunting the “living tree” Constitution that the 
Supreme Court has so diligently nurtured. The recognition of unenumer-
ated principles of fundamental justice forecloses the application of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.19 The principles of fundamental jus-
tice incorporate into section 7 of the Charter those unwritten principles 
that are fundamental to a free and democratic society. They thus serve to 
ensure that the specific enumeration of fundamental rights and freedoms 
does not leave Canadians less free than they were prior to the Charter’s 
enactment. Under the historical approach, section 7 must incorporate 
those principles that were fundamental to our legal system at the time of 
the Charter’s adoption, but not necessarily any others.  
(a) From MVR to Oickle and Latimer  
Claims rooted in the historical principles of fundamental justice are 
relatively straightforward for rights claimants. To establish a principle of 
fundamental justice under this theory, one need only identify a historical 
precedent. If there is an unbroken chain of rights protection reaching 
back to our Nation’s pre-Charter history, that principle will be recognized 
as a principle of fundamental justice. MVR was an easy case precisely 
because the principle at issue — the requirement of mens rea as a 
prerequisite for criminal liability — is firmly embedded in our Nation’s 
                                                                                                             
Aboriginal men) of their status for marrying a non-Indian did not violate their right to “equality 
before the law” under the Canadian Bill of Rights).  
18  West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, at 638 (1943), 
per Jackson J. 
19  “The express mention of one thing excludes all others.” See Turgeon v. Dominion Bank, 
[1929] S.C.J. No. 56, [1930] S.C.R. 67, at 70-71 (S.C.C.); Ruth Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, 
5th ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2008), at 251-52. 
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legal history, traditions and jurisprudence.20 In MVR, British Columbia 
had created an absolute liability offence for driving with a suspended 
licence. The Crown needed only to establish proof of driving regardless 
of whether the driver was aware of the suspension or not. This law 
offended the principles of fundamental justice. Absolute liability — i.e., 
the complete absence of a guilty mind — offends the principle that the 
morally innocent should not be punished. This principle, as Lamer J. 
noted, “has from time immemorial been part of our system of laws”.21 
With history as its arbiter, there was no need for the Court to go further 
in its inquiry. 
The “confessions rule” is another principle of fundamental justice 
that the Supreme Court identified using the historical approach.22 In 
Oickle,23 the Court traced the lineage of the confessions rule to a number 
of pre-Charter common law decisions, relying, inter alia, on the Privy 
Council’s 1914 holding in Ibrahim v. R. that “no statement by an accused 
is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shewn by the 
prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the sense that it has 
not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of 
advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority”.24 As the Court 
noted in Oickle, the Supreme Court of Canada had adopted and 
repeatedly re-affirmed the rule from Ibrahim in its pre-Charter 
jurisprudence.25 The Court did not need to go further. The confessions 
rule’s status as a pre-Charter fundamental principle had “grandfathered” 
it into the section 7 principles of fundamental justice.  
                                                                                                             
20  MVR, supra, note 6, at 514 (“Absolute liability in penal law offends the principles of 
fundamental justice.”). 
21  Id., at 513. 
22  Although the Court in Oickle held that the confessions rule is still a “common law” rule 
rather than a Charter right, commentators note that the Court has treated it as a principle of fundamental 
justice protected by s. 7. See R. v. G. (B.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 29, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 475, at para. 44 
(S.C.C.) (holding that “Parliament could not make [an involuntary statement] admissible for any 
purpose whatsoever without violating s. 7 of the Charter”); see also Hamish Stewart, Fundamental 
Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), at 213 
[hereinafter “Stewart”]. See contra Hon. Gary T. Trotter, “The Limits of Police Interrogation: The 
Limits of the Charter” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 293 (arguing that the common law confessions rule 
continues to have relevance and that attempts to “Charter-ize” it may erode its protections). 
23  R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 24 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Oickle”]. 
24  [1914] A.C. 599, at 609 (J.C.P.C.). 
25  R. v. Prosko, [1922] S.C.J. No. 6, 63 S.C.R. 226 (S.C.C.); R. v. Boudreau, [1949] 
S.C.J. No. 10, [1949] S.C.R. 262 (S.C.C.); R. v. Fitton, [1956] S.C.J. No. 70, [1956] S.C.R. 958 (S.C.C.); 
R. v. Wray, [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, [1971] S.C.R. 272 (S.C.C.); R. v. Rothman, [1981] S.C.J. No. 55, 
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.). 
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Solicitor-client privilege is yet another principle of fundamental justice 
that the Supreme Court derived from the historically based approach to the 
principles of fundamental justice.26 The Court held that it is beyond dispute 
that solicitor-client privilege existed and was jealously protected well 
before the enactment of the Charter. This principle is among the “oldest of 
the privileges”, having “roots in the 16th century”.27  
The right to make full answer and defence is another example of a 
principle of fundamental justice identified using the historical approach. 
Although not specifically enumerated by the Charter, this right was 
deemed protected by the principles of fundamental justice because of that 
right’s pre-Charter common law status as “one of the pillars of criminal 
justice on which we heavily depend to ensure that the innocent are not 
convicted”.28  
Where a principle of fundamental justice has been anchored in 
historical precedent, the Supreme Court has felt itself on surer footing 
when granting a forceful remedy. In R. v. Latimer, a case in which the 
accused was charged with murder for euthanizing his disabled daughter, 
the Crown had interfered with jury selection by distributing 
questionnaires to prospective jurors, asking them for their opinions about 
various social issues, including euthanasia. Quoting from an oft-cited 
English case, Lamer J. held that “[t]he interference contravened a 
fundamental tenet of the criminal justice system, which Lord Hewart C.J. 
put felicitously as ‘justice should not only be done, but should manifestly 
and undoubtedly be seen to be done’”.29 The state’s interference with 
prospective jurors offended this principle of fundamental justice. It was 
                                                                                                             
26  R. v. McClure, [2001] S.C.J. No. 13, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, at paras. 25-28 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “McClure”]. See also Canada v. Solosky, [1979] S.C.J. No. 130, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821, 
at 833-36 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Solosky”]; Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski, [1982] S.C.J. No. 43, [1982] 1 
S.C.R. 860, at 875 (S.C.C.); Smith v. Jones, [1999] S.C.J. No. 15, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455, at paras. 44-50 
(S.C.C.); Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 61, [2002] 3 
S.C.R. 209, at paras. 18-19 (S.C.C.); Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2004] 
S.C.J. No. 16, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809, at paras. 16-17 (S.C.C.); Goodis v. Ontario (Ministry of 
Correctional Services), [2006] S.C.J. No. 31, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 32, at paras. 15-17, 22-25 (S.C.C.); 
Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Blood Tribe Department of Health, [2008] S.C.J. No. 45, [2008] 
2 S.C.R. 574, at paras. 11, 16-17 (S.C.C.). 
27  McClure, id., at para. 20. 
28  R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at 336 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Stinchcombe”] (citing Dersch v. Canada (Attorney General), [1990] S.C.J. No. 113, [1990] 
2 S.C.R. 1505, at 1514 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Rose, [1998] S.C.J. No. 81, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262, at para. 98 
(S.C.C.); McClure, id., at paras. 38-39.  
29  R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217, at para. 43 (S.C.C.) (quoting 
R. v. Sussex Justices, [1923] All E.R. Rep. 233, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, at 259 (K.B.D.)). 
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immaterial whether the state interference resulted in selecting jurors who 
were actually biased or whether the ultimate fairness of the trial was 
affected. The violation of the fundamental principle that “justice must be 
seen to be done” demanded a new trial. 
The combination of a violation of a historical principle of fundamen-
tal justice, coupled with a strong remedy, stands in contrast to other 
cases, where the Court, despite recognizing a “new” principle of funda-
mental justice, will grant a lesser remedy. The Court in Oickle held that a 
violation of the historical confessions rule “always warrants exclusion” 
of evidence, whereas a violation of the related Charter right to silence 
will justify exclusion of evidence only where its admission would “bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute”.30 
(b)  The Limits of the Historical Approach 
The historical approach to the principles of fundamental justice 
answers Lamer J.’s critics who argue that his vision of section 7 is vague, 
indeterminate and unprincipled.31 If the principles of fundamental justice 
are rooted in historical precedent, then they are necessarily finite and 
identifiable.  
Yet, the historical approach is unsatisfactory as a generalized theory. 
First, “[a]ll history becomes subjective”.32 It is also murky. While some 
rights and principles can be neatly traced back to the Magna Carta, those 
cases will be relatively rare. Solicitor-client privilege, for example, has a 
venerable history, but for much of that history, it was a rule of evidence 
rather than a substantive legal principle. Its elevation to fundamental 
principle occurred much later.33  
Further, to rely solely on the historical approach to the principles of 
fundamental justice is to freeze section 7’s development in 1982: only 
rights that already had been recognized as fundamental in the pre-Charter 
era could receive section 7’s constitutional protection. This would be at 
odds with the large, liberal and purposive approach to constitutional 
                                                                                                             
30  Oickle, supra, note 23, at para. 30. 
31  See, e.g., Jamie Cameron, “From the MVR to Chaoulli v. Quebec: The Road Not Taken 
and the Future of Section 7” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 105 [hereinafter “Cameron, ‘From the MVR to 
Chaoulli’”] (for criticism of indeterminacy of “MVR logic”); Cameron, supra, note 2, at 556. 
32  Ralph Waldo Emerson, “History” in Essays (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1883), at 10. 
33  Solosky, supra, note 26, at 834-35. See also Mahmud Jamal & Brian Morgan, 
“The Constitutionalization of Solicitor-Client Privilege” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (3d) 213, at 214-29.  
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interpretation that the Court has continually espoused.34 In MVR, Lamer J., 
despite stating that the principles of fundamental justice would be found in 
our legal traditions, also cautioned that the interpretation of section 7 must 
account for the “newly planted ‘living tree’ which is the Charter”, which 
should allow for the “possibility of growth and adjustment over time”, and 
should not be stultified by “historical materials”.35 
In addition, the historical approach does not explain many of the 
principles of fundamental justice that have been recognized since MVR. 
Many of the principles of fundamental justice that are discussed in the 
next two sections are not anchored in historical precedent.  
Indeed, some of the most firmly entrenched principles of fundamental 
justice are not just unexplained by, but plainly inconsistent with, a 
historical approach. For example, it is now well established that laws that 
limit the right to life, liberty or security of the person and are “arbitrary”, 
“overbroad” or “grossly disproportionate” will offend the principles of 
fundamental justice.36 The very idea that laws could be judicially 
reviewed on such grounds was anathema to Canada’s pre-Charter 
Westminster system of government, where Parliament reigned supreme. 
Prior to the Charter’s enactment, provided that government respected its 
jurisdictional limits, there was nothing that prevented Parliament from 
passing laws that were arbitrary, overbroad or grossly disproportionate in 
relation to the liberty interests of the Canadian people. Whatever the 
doctrinal rationale of substantive review of legislation on grounds of 
disproportionality, it is not rooted in history. Thus, while the historical 
approach is a useful theory to explain some principles of fundamental 
justice, it does not and cannot account for all of them. 
2.  The Penumbra Theory of Principles of Fundamental Justice 
The penumbra theory of the principles of fundamental justice justifies 
the recognition of section 7 principles of fundamental justice that are not 
firmly anchored in historical precedent. Under this approach, the 
principles of fundamental justice protected by section 7 and the legal 
rights enshrined in sections 8 to 14 of the Charter form an interconnected 
                                                                                                             
34  Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155-56 (S.C.C.). 
35  MVR, supra, note 6, at 509. 
36  See infra, Part II.3(c). 
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normative framework, which inform each other.37 The rights enumerated 
under sections 8 to 14 of the Charter are illustrations of principles of 
fundamental justice. The unwritten penumbra principles serve to fill in the 
gaps left by the enumerated principles of fundamental justice contained in 
sections 8 to 14 of the Charter and the historically entrenched section 7 
principles of fundamental justice. In this way, the historical approach and 
the penumbra theory are complementary. Under the penumbra theory, 
principles that cannot be traced to history or the constitutional text may 
nonetheless be worthy of protection as fundamental if they are necessary 
to give established rights and principles meaning and effect. 
The term “penumbra” is borrowed from U.S. constitutional law.38 
In Griswold v. Connecticut,39 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a 
constitutionally protected right to privacy.40 The right to privacy was not 
specifically enumerated in the U.S. Bill of Rights, but Douglas J., writing 
for the majority, held that the “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance”.41 In essence, the enumerated rights have 
penumbras that help protect the core. The Griswold decision formed the 
intellectual bedrock for the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in 
Roe v. Wade, where the Court ruled that the constitutional right to privacy 
protected a woman’s right to have an abortion.42 
In MVR, Lamer J. embraced the idea of a penumbra around section 7 
and sections 8 to 14 of the Charter (although he did not use that termi-
nology). He describes the formation of a penumbra emanating from 
section 7 and sections 8 to 14 that fills in gaps left by the enumerated 
rights. Justice Lamer noted that “ss. 8 to 14 provide an invaluable key to 
                                                                                                             
37  See Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, 
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, at 536 (S.C.C.), 
per La Forest J. (“[T]he rights and freedoms protected by the Charter are not insular and discrete, 
but are aimed rather at protecting a complex of interacting values, each more or less fundamental to 
the free and democratic society that is Canada.”) (citations omitted). 
38  I am mindful of Cardozo J.’s pointed warning that “[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly 
watched, for starting out as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it”. Berkey v. 
Third Ave. Ry, 244 N.Y. 84, at 94 (1926), per Cardozo J. 
39  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
40  While Griswold is credited with popularizing the use of the penumbra metaphor, the 
metaphor can be traced to an 1873 statement by Holmes J. See O.W. Holmes, “The Theory of Torts” 
(1873) 7 Am. L. Rev. 652, at 654, reprinted in (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 773, at 775. See also Burr 
Henly, “‘Penumbra’: The Roots of a Legal Metaphor” (1987-1988) 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 81, at 83-84. 
41  Id. 
42  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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the meaning of ‘principles of fundamental justice’”.43 He further ex-
plained that:  
Sections 8 to 14 are illustrative of deprivations of those rights to life, 
liberty and security of the person in breach of the principles of 
fundamental justice. For they, in effect, illustrate some of the 
parameters of the “right” to life, liberty and security of the person; they 
are examples of instances in which the “right” to life, liberty and 
security of the person would be violated in a manner which is not in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. To put matters in 
a different way, ss. 7 to 14 could have been fused into one section, with 
inserted between the words of s. 7 and the rest of those sections the oft 
utilized provision in our statutes, “and, without limiting the generality 
of the foregoing (s. 7) the following shall be deemed to be in violation 
of a person’s rights under this section”.44  
Section 7 and sections 8 to 14 are conceptually “fused”. Each of the 
enumerated rights informs the scope of the other. From these emanations, 
new principles of fundamental justice emerge. But the emanations from 
these penumbras are not unfettered. A principle will be recognized as a 
principle of fundamental justice only if that new principle is necessary to 
give existing rights and principles a full, meaningful and purposive 
interpretation. The penumbra principles are thus “gap fillers”. They serve 
to ensure that the state cannot undermine constitutional protections by 
doing indirectly what is directly forbidden. 
(a) The Growing Penumbra 
The Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Hebert exemplifies the 
penumbra theory.45 In Hebert, the Court affirmed a robust pre-trial right to 
silence under section 7. Hebert had been arrested and was in custody. He 
had asserted his right to counsel and told the police that he did not wish to 
make a statement. He was then put in a cell next to an undercover officer 
posing as a suspect, who engaged the accused in conversation. The 
accused made various incriminating statements, which he sought to 
exclude on section 7 Charter grounds. However, the historical principles of 
fundamental justice alone would not have afforded Hebert any relief. The 
historical common law confessions rule set out in Ibrahim v. R. protects the 
                                                                                                             
43  MVR, supra, note 6, at 503. 
44  Id., at 502-503. 
45  [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hebert”]. 
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accused from overt threats or inducements. The common law also afforded 
the accused the right to remain silent.46 These historical common law 
rights, however, did not on their own, protect the accused from the 
deceptive police conduct at issue in Hebert. 
But Hebert was protected by the section 7 penumbra. Justice 
McLachlin (as she then was), writing for the majority, held that the 
common law confessions rule and common law right to silence did not 
exhaust the Charter’s protection because “[i]t would be wrong to assume 
that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter are cast forever in 
the straight-jacket of the law as it stood in 1982”.47 A principle of 
fundamental justice “may be broader and more general than the particular 
[pre-existing] rules which exemplify it”.48  
Justice McLachlin thus looked to the penumbra: “[T]he right of a de-
tained person to silence should be philosophically compatible with 
related rights, such as the right against self-incrimination at trial and the 
right to counsel.”49 The right against self-incrimination and the common 
law confessions rule must be construed purposefully. Both were rooted in 
an abhorrence of the old ecclesiastical courts and the Star Chamber, 
which gave rise to the fundamental tenet that a citizen involved in the 
criminal process must be afforded procedural protections against the 
overweening power of the state.50 The right to counsel serves a comple-
mentary role, ensuring that the accused understands his right not to be 
compelled to produce evidence against himself.51 These rights and prin-
ciples are meant to give the accused a bona fide choice as to whether to 
speak to the police.  
For these rights and principles to be meaningful, the accused must be 
afforded a robust right to silence. That right must be broad enough to 
preclude attempts by the state to unreasonably leverage its superior 
power to overwhelm the accused’s ability to choose whether to speak to 
the police. Thus, the section 7 right to silence precludes the use of “tricks 
which would effectively deprive the suspect of this choice [to remain 
silent]”.52 Anything less would permit the police to do indirectly what the 
                                                                                                             
46  R. v. Rothman, [1981] S.C.J. No. 55, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 682 (S.C.C.), per Lamer J. 
47  Hebert, supra, note 45, at 163. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
50  Id., at 173-74. 
51  Id., at 176-77. 
52  Id., at 180. 
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Charter does not permit them to do directly and render the right to coun-
sel and right against self-incrimination illusory.53 
The penumbra of the pre-trial right to silence extends to a right to si-
lence at trial and also limits the evidentiary use of the accused’s exercise 
of his right to silence. As the Court noted in R. v. Chambers, the pre-trial 
right to silence “would be an illusory right if the decision not to speak to 
the police could be used by the Crown as evidence of guilt”.54 Hence, a 
majority of the Court in R. v. Noble held that the Crown could not invite 
the jury to infer guilt from the accused’s exercise of the right to silence.55 
Justice Fish recently re-affirmed this right in R. v. Prokofiew.56 This line 
of cases represents an aggressive yet principled expansion of the section 7 
penumbra to ensure that the right to silence retains its meaningfulness at 
all stages of the criminal prosecution. These rights are not specifically 
enumerated in any constitutional text, but their protection was necessary 
to protect “core” Charter rights. 
Other important examples in the penumbra line of cases include 
R. v. Pearson57 and R. v. Gardiner,58 which dealt with the penumbra of 
the presumption of innocence at bail and at sentencing, respectively.59 
The presumption of innocence is expressly enumerated in section 11(d) 
of the Charter, which provides that “[a]ny person charged with an 
offence has the right ... to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal”. A strict reading of section 11(d) would limit the 
applicability of the presumption of innocence to trial. However, as 
Dickson C.J.C. held in R. v. Oakes, a more general protection of the 
presumption of innocence can be found within the penumbra of section 7 
and section 11(d) of the Charter: “although protected expressly in 
s. 11(d) of the Charter, the presumption of innocence is referable and 
                                                                                                             
53  Id., at 180-81. 
54  R. v. Chambers, [1990] S.C.J. No. 108, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1293, at 1316 (S.C.C.) (quoting 
R. v. Turcotte, [2005] S.C.J. No. 51, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 519, at 533 (S.C.C.)). 
55  R. v. Noble, [1997] S.C.J. No. 40, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874 (S.C.C.). 
56  [2012] S.C.J. No. 49, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 639, at paras. 64-66 (S.C.C.), per Fish J., 
dissenting on other grounds. The Prokofiew majority did not reconsider R. v. Noble despite having 
been asked by the Crown to overturn it.  
57  [1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pearson”]. 
58  [1982] S.C.J. No. 71, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368 (S.C.C.). 
59  Although Gardiner was a pre-Charter case, the rule from Gardiner arguably was 
constitutionalized in R. v. Pearson. 
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integral to the general protection of life, liberty and security of the 
person contained in s. 7 of the Charter”.60  
The corollary of the general right to be presumed innocent throughout 
the criminal justice process is a corresponding requirement that the Crown 
retain the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt throughout the 
prosecution.61 Consequently, in R. v. Gardiner, the Supreme Court held 
that because the sentencing process was the “ultimate jeopardy” to the 
individual, the Crown should not be permitted to do through 
the sentencing process what it was expressly forbidden from doing during 
the trial. Thus, where the Crown seeks to advance aggravating facts at a 
sentencing hearing, the Crown must establish those facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This right of the accused to hold the Crown to a proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard at sentencing resides in the penumbra 
of sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.  
Similarly, in R. v. Pearson, the Court held that the presumption of in-
nocence informed the meaning of the section 11(e) right to a reasonable 
bail. Again, while the section 11(d) presumption of innocence did not on 
its face appear to apply to bail hearings, the general section 7 right to be 
presumed innocent informed the proper interpretation of section 11(e) of 
the Charter.62 It is thus a principle of fundamental justice that an accused 
shall be presumed innocent at her bail hearing.  
The right to Crown disclosure can also be found in the penumbra of 
section 7. In R. v. Stinchcombe, a unanimous Court noted that at common 
law there was a duty on the Crown to “bring forward evidence of every 
material fact known to the prosecution whether favourable to the accused 
or otherwise”.63 That right, along with the common law right to make full 
answer and defence, which had “acquired new vigour by virtue of its 
inclusion in s. 7” of the Charter, underscored the need for a more robust 
right to disclosure.64 The Crown’s obligation to disclose under the 
Charter is thus broader than the duty that existed at common law, and 
extends to all material in its possession relating to the investigation 
against the accused unless it is clearly irrelevant or privileged.65 In R. v. 
                                                                                                             
60  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 119 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Oakes”]. 
61  Id., at 120. 
62  Pearson, supra, note 57, at 688-89. 
63  Stinchcombe, supra, note 28, at 338 (quoting R. v. Lemay, [1951] S.C.J. No. 42, [1952] 
1 S.C.R. 232, at 257 (S.C.C.)). 
64  Id., at 336. 
65  Id., at 335-36. 
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McNeil, the Court further expanded the penumbra of full answer and 
defence and held that under the Stinchcombe disclosure regime, the Crown 
had a good-faith duty to inquire as to whether any other law enforcement 
agency, such as the police, possessed information that was potentially 
relevant to the Crown’s case or the accused’s defence.66 
The right to cross-examination is also located in the penumbra of 
section 11(d) and the section 7 right to make full answer and defence.67 
In R. v. Lyttle, the Supreme Court held that the penumbra of this right 
extended to “the right of an accused to cross-examine witnesses for the 
prosecution without significant and unwarranted constraint”.68 
The penumbra theory also explains the principles of fundamental 
justice that govern jury selection. The common law protected the right to 
an impartial jury. This right had been constitutionalized under section 11(f) 
of the Charter, which guaranteed the right to a jury trial where the 
maximum punishment for an offence exceeds five years’ imprisonment. 
In R. v. Sherratt, the Court held that the section 11(f) right to a jury must 
be understood with reference to the section 11(d) right to a fair trial.69 
Jury selection should be driven by the “fundamental rights to a fair trial 
by an impartial jury and to equality before and under the law”.70 As a 
corollary, juries must be representative of the community.71  
The penumbra of this right to a fair, impartial and representative jury, 
required modification of the common law and statutory rules regarding 
jury selection. At common law and in the Criminal Code,72 the Crown 
and the accused were not on equal footing when it came to the number of 
prospective jurors they could dismiss without cause during jury selection. 
Under the Criminal Code’s rules, the Crown could ask up to 48 prospec-
tive jurors to “stand by” in the jury selection process. The stand-by was a 
tool of long-standing historical precedent, dating back to the 1300s.73 
These stand-bys provided by the Criminal Code were in addition to the 
four peremptory challenges permitted to the Crown, giving the Crown a 
4.25-1 numerical advantage in excusing prospective jurors. In R. v. 
                                                                                                             
66  R. v. McNeil, [2009] S.C.J. No. 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66, at paras. 48-51 (S.C.C.). 
67  R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, at 665 (S.C.C.). 
68  R. v. Lyttle, [2004] S.C.J. No. 8, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193, at para. 1 (S.C.C.). 
69  R. v. Sherratt, [1991] S.C.J. No. 21, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 509 (S.C.C.). 
70  R. v. Williams, [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, at para. 49 (S.C.C.). 
71  Id., at paras. 42-47. 
72  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
73  Sanjeev Anand, “The Origins, Early History and Evolution of the English Criminal Trial 
Jury” (2005) 43 Alta. L. Rev. 407, at paras. 38-40. 
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Bain,74 the accused challenged the stand-by provisions of the Criminal 
Code. Although the Crown’s numerical advantage was prescribed by law 
and had long been a part of the common law, the majority of the Court 
held that “the overwhelming numerical superiority of choice granted to 
the Crown creates a pervasive air of unfairness in the jury selection pro-
cedure”.75 There was no specific right in the Charter that required parity 
between the Crown and the accused when it came to jury selection. But 
this inequality was incompatible with the right to an impartial and repre-
sentative jury protected by the penumbra of sections 7, 11(d) and 11(f) of 
the Charter. 
There are arguably examples where it is difficult to discern whether a 
section 7 principle of fundamental justice is properly categorized as be-
longing to the penumbra or whether it is a historical principle. The right 
to Stinchcombe disclosure is one such example. On one hand, the fact 
that prosecutors had “generally cooperated in making disclosure avail-
able” gave rise to an argument that the common law required Crown 
disclosure. Justice Sopinka, however, held that “the law with respect to 
the duty of the Crown to disclose is not settled”.76 To the extent that any 
right to Crown disclosure existed at common law, there was likely insuf-
ficient evidence in the historical record to show that it was protected as a 
fundamental right. Accordingly, it is properly categorized within the pe-
numbra of section 7 and the right to make full answer and defence. Still, 
it is worth noting that these categories are not watertight compartments, 
but rather useful ways of organizing the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
methodologies in its section 7 decisions. 
As “gap-fillers”, the penumbra principles of fundamental justice share 
some similarities with “unwritten constitutional principles”.77 Granted, all 
section 7 principles of fundamental justice that are not enumerated in 
sections 8 to 14 are “unwritten” in addition to being “constitutional 
principles”. Yet, the penumbra principles of fundamental justice in 
section 7 are conceptually distinct from the unwritten constitutional 
principles (as that term is normally understood). Although a detailed 
examination of the relationship between these concepts is beyond the 
scope of this article, it is important that they not be conflated. Both the 
                                                                                                             
74  [1992] S.C.J. No. 3, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91, at 103 (S.C.C.). 
75  Id., at 103, per Cory J. 
76  Stinchcombe, supra, note 28, at 331. 
77  See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 
at paras. 49-54 (S.C.C.). 
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penumbra principles of fundamental justice and the unwritten 
constitutional principles function as “gap fillers”, but the size of the gaps 
they fill differs. Whereas the penumbra principles fill the gaps in the 
interstitia between sections 7 and 14 of the Charter, the unwritten 
constitutional principles involve overarching “vital unstated assumptions” 
and “organizing principles” that animate the entire written text of the 
Constitution and our legal system.78 The penumbra principles involve 
ensuring that existing legal rights protected under sections 7 to 14 are not 
undermined by gaps in the constitutional framework and thus are 
anchored in the text. Unwritten constitutional principles — like the “rule 
of law”79 or “independence of the judiciary”80 — are foundational and 
might not be moored to the text of the Constitution at all.81 
(b)  The Waning Penumbra 
The penumbra mode of reasoning was a mainstay of the Court’s 
early section 7 jurisprudence. It is lamentable, however, that the Court 
did not explicitly acknowledge it. Justices of the Supreme Court come 
and go, and unspoken but implicit rules and doctrines retire along with 
their proponents. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that although the  
penumbra approach led to an explosion of newly recognized section 7 
rights during the 1990s, its use has receded in recent years, sometimes 
depriving litigants of their best arguments. The Supreme Court’s decisions 
in R. v. Singh and R. v. Sinclair are useful examples.82  
Mr. Singh was charged with first degree murder. After consulting 
with counsel, he advised the police that he did not wish to make a state-
ment. The police persisted in attempting to question Mr. Singh despite 
his 18 declarations that he wished to remain silent. Eventually, Mr. Singh 
gave an incriminating statement. In a 5-4 decision, the majority of the 
Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the right to silence. 
                                                                                                             
78  Id., at paras. 49, 53.  
79  Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] S.C.J. No. 36, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 
(S.C.C.). 
80  Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.), [1997] S.C.J. 
No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
81  See Sujit Choudhry, “Unwritten Constitutionalism in Canada: Where Do Things Stand?” 
(2001) 35 Can. Bus. L.J. 113; Alex Schwartz, “The Rules of Unwritten Law: A Cautious Critique of 
Charkaoui v. Canada” (2007-2008) 13 Rev. Const. Stud. 179. 
82  R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”]; 
R. v. Sinclair, [2010] S.C.J. No. 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sinclair”]. 
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While Mr. Singh had a right to silence, the police were not precluded 
from trying to persuade him to waive that right, provided that their tac-
tics did not cause Mr. Singh’s will to be overborne.83 
Justice Fish, writing for the four dissenting justices, held that the 
police “unfairly frustrated [Mr. Singh’s] decision on the question of 
whether to make a statement to the authorities”.84 His reasoning evoked 
the section 7 penumbra: The police’s denigration of counsel’s advice and 
failure to respect Mr. Singh’s right to silence “collaterally” infringed 
Mr. Singh’s right to counsel.85 For the right to silence and right to 
counsel to be meaningful, the police must be under a corollary duty to 
respect the invocation of that right. Justice Fish’s decision is 
conceptually consistent with the penumbra approaches of the 1990s, but 
by 2006 when Singh was decided, that approach was a dissenting one.86 
Sinclair followed a similar pattern. Mr. Sinclair was arrested and 
detained. He was advised of his right to counsel and right to silence. He 
exercised his right to counsel (speaking to counsel twice) and repeatedly 
maintained that he did not want to speak to the police. He also asked if 
his counsel could be present during the interrogation. The police 
succeeded in eventually convincing Mr. Sinclair to speak with them and 
he eventually incriminated himself in a murder plot. He argued that the 
police had infringed his Charter rights on the basis that rights protected 
under section 10(b) and section 7 of the Charter afforded him not just the 
right to counsel but the right to meaningful assistance, which includes the 
right to have counsel present during an in-custody interrogation. By a 6-3 
majority, the Supreme Court rejected this argument.87 
In many ways, Sinclair ought to have been a paradigmatic penumbra 
case. The purpose of the penumbra principles of fundamental justice is to 
ensure that core rights protected by established principles of fundamental 
justice are not undermined by gaps in our constitutional framework. 
A panoply of principles of fundamental justice protected Mr. Sinclair: the 
right to silence, the right against self-incrimination and the presumption 
of innocence all work together to ensure that suspects are never obligated 
                                                                                                             
83  Singh, id., at paras. 38-53. 
84  Id., at para. 63 (quoting Hebert, supra, note 45). 
85  Id., at para. 62. 
86  See Lisa Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle against Self-Incrimination under the 
Charter” (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 241, at 257 (noting the dissonance between the Supreme Court’s 
majority opinions in Hebert and Singh). 
87  Sinclair, supra, note 82, at para. 38. 
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to participate in building the case against them.88 The right to counsel 
ensures that the accused is made aware of his rights and how to effec-
tively exercise them,89 and above all, is “treated fairly in the criminal 
process”.90 Sinclair had properly invoked his constitutional rights. But by 
waiting until after the accused had spoken to counsel and by ignoring 
Sinclair’s right to silence (which was permitted by the Court’s holding in 
Singh), the police undermined those constitutional safeguards. As Binnie J. 
pointed out in dissent,91 the police had succeeded in rendering Sinclair’s 
counsel as effective as a telephone answering service providing two  
minutes of pre-recorded legal advice. The penumbra principles of fun-
damental justice exist to avoid such absurd outcomes. As the Sinclair 
dissent explained, a robust right to counsel, which protected the right to 
have counsel present during an interrogation, would have bridged the gap 
in the constitutional framework.92  
Despite Singh and Sinclair, the penumbra theory remains a 
conceptually attractive, middle-of-the-road approach to the principles of 
fundamental justice. Although the penumbra theory is broader than the 
historical approach, it is not indeterminate. Penumbra principles of 
fundamental justice are derivative of pre-existing rights found in the 
common law and in the Charter’s enumerated provisions. The penumbra 
theory thus strikes the appropriate balance between a conception of section 7 
that is frozen in 1982 and an approach so broad that it is indeterminate. 
Still, even at its highest, the penumbra theory may be unduly restrictive. 
Justice Lamer moored the penumbra of section 7 to the “Legal Rights” 
contained in sections 8 to 14 of the Charter, and in so doing, expressly 
excluded from the penumbra the fundamental freedoms (section 2), 
democratic rights (sections 3-4), mobility rights (section 6) and equality 
rights (section 15) guaranteed by the Charter.93 Subsequent case law 
appears to have followed suit. In C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and 
Family Services),94 the Court rejected the rights-holder’s claim that her right 
to religious freedom under section 2(a) augmented her section 7 right to be 
                                                                                                             
88  Id., at 156-59, per LeBel and Fish JJ., dissenting. 
89  R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233, at 1242-43 (S.C.C.). 
90  R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, at 191 (S.C.C.). 
91  Sinclair, supra, note 82, at para. 86, per Binnie J., dissenting. 
92  Id., at paras. 124-130, per Fish and LeBel JJ., dissenting. 
93  This was likely intentional. As Prof. Cameron has pointed out, Lamer J.’s attempt to limit 
s. 7’s applicability to situations where the legal administration was engaged may have been his 
attempt to ensure that s. 7’s net was not cast too wide. See Cameron, “From the MVR to Chaoulli”, 
supra, note 31. 
94  [2009] S.C.J. No. 30, 309 D.L.R. (4th) 581 (S.C.C.). 
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free from state interference with a decision to refuse a blood transfusion. 
Similarly, in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General)95 and Charkaoui v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),96 cases in which the section 15(1) 
equality claim appeared to dovetail with the section 7 claims, the Court kept 
the section 15(1) and section 7 analyses distinct, not permitting the equality 
dimension of the claim to permeate the section 7 analysis.  
Gosselin involved a Charter challenge to Quebec’s social assistance 
scheme, which set the base amount of welfare payable to persons under 
the age of 30 at roughly one third of the base amount payable to those 30 
and over. The scheme was challenged under both section 7 and section 15(1) 
of the Charter. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, in dissent, would have recognized 
a penumbra emanating from section 7 and section 15, holding that 
interpretations of section 15 can inform section 7 and vice versa.97 The 
majority, however, rejected the idea of a section 7/section 15 penumbra, 
holding that section 7 — like the other legal rights — required a nexus to 
the administration of justice. Section 15 did not require such a nexus, 
making the two sections analytically separate.98 
Charkaoui provides a good example where, if anywhere, a  
section 7/section 15 penumbra was ripe for recognition. In Charkaoui, the 
appellants challenged the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act’s 
security certificate scheme, which permitted the Minister to authorize the 
lengthy, if not indefinite, detention of the person named in the security 
certificate on the basis of reasonable grounds that the named person was a 
national security threat. The scheme applied only to non-citizens. The 
spectre of lengthy, indeterminate or indefinite detention, coupled with the 
differential treatment of non-citizens, triggered both section 7 and 
section 15 of the Charter. Because membership in a disadvantaged, 
discrete and insular group (non-citizens) was the impetus for a serious 
deprivation of liberty (indefinite detention) under the scheme, Charkaoui 
was an appropriate case in which to recognize the penumbra between 
section 7 and section 15 of the Charter.  
Indeed, this is precisely how a majority of the British House of Lords 
analyzed a similar legislative scheme under the United Kingdom’s 
Terrorism Act 2000.99 In the majority of the Law Lords’ analyses, the 
                                                                                                             
95  [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gosselin”]. 
96  [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui”]. 
97  Gosselin, supra, note 95, at paras. 144-146, per L’Heureux-Dubé J. 
98  Id., at paras. 75-79, per McLachlin C.J.C. 
99  A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 
2 A.C. 68 (H.L.). 
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equality and the liberty claims were conceptually fused. As Lord Nichols 
pointedly observed, “it is difficult to see how the extreme circumstances, 
which alone would justify such [prolonged or indefinite] detention, can 
exist when lesser protective steps apparently suffice in the case of British 
citizens suspected of being international terrorists”.100 The arbitrariness 
of using citizenship as a proxy for dangerousness rendered the legislation 
both overbroad and underbroad by “leaving British suspected terrorists at 
large … while imposing the severe penalty of indefinite detention on 
[foreign nationals]”.101 On this basis, the House of Lords declared the 
legislation to be incompatible with the U.K.’s international treaty 
obligations under the European Human Rights Convention.  
Despite this precedent, the Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui 
kept the liberty and equality claims analytically distinct, analyzing 
section 7 issues without regard to the differential treatment of  
non-citizens and then going on to dismiss the section 15 claim in a terse 
four paragraphs.102 In both Gosselin and Charkaoui, the inevitable effect 
of compartmentalizing the respective section 7 and section 15 claims was 
to weaken both arguments.  
Other than the need to restrain the reach of section 7, it is unclear 
whether there is a sound doctrinal reason as to why the penumbra of the 
principles of fundamental justice should be limited to sections 7 to 14 of 
the Charter. Some commentators and jurists justify such a limit on the 
ground that section 7 and sections 8 to 14 fall under the “Legal Rights” 
heading of the Charter,103 and therefore, their application is limited to 
contexts in which the “administration of justice” or an “adjudicative 
setting” is engaged. The Supreme Court’s early decisions on section 7 
appeared to give effect to this idea and suggested that section 7 applied 
only to deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person “that occur 
as a result of an individual’s interaction with the justice system and its 
administration”.104 However, the Court later held that a nexus with the 
administration of justice may not be necessary to trigger section 7.105 If a 
                                                                                                             
100  Id., at para. 75, per Lord Nichols. 
101  Id., at para. 43, per Lord Bingham. 
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103  See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed., looseleaf (Scarborough, ON: 
Thomson Carswell, 2006), at 37-1 - 37-3, 47-5. 
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S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at para. 65 (S.C.C.). 
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S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.); Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 
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nexus to the administration of justice is not necessary to trigger section 7, 
then the penumbra of section 7 should not be limited to “Legal Rights” 
(sections 7 to 14) but should apply more broadly to other Charter provisions.  
3.  Principles of Fundamental Justice Based on Evolving Societal 
Values  
Not all principles of fundamental justice that fall outside of the 
historical category can be explained by the penumbra theory. A third 
theory of the principles of fundamental justice — “founded upon the 
belief in the dignity and worth of the human person” and “on the rule of 
law”106 — has emerged in the case law. This theory is the most expansive 
and thus potentially the most indeterminate. Principles of fundamental 
justice rooted in this theory are recognized where a section 7 right to life, 
liberty or security of the person outweighs a competing government 
interest. These principles of fundamental justice protect an evolving set 
of national values, which command widespread contemporary support, as 
reflected in legal developments and societal understandings that may 
change over time.  
Saying that this third theory is founded upon human dignity is not to 
suggest that human dignity is unimportant under the first two theories. 
Respect for the inherent human dignity of all people is arguably the 
animating principle behind all Charter rights.107 The difference is that 
under the first two theories, the principle of fundamental justice is 
anchored in precedent or is closely connected to pre-existing principles 
through the penumbra. Under this third theory, respect for human dignity 
and individual autonomy drives the analysis.  
(a)  The Expansive Era of the Evolving Rights Theory 
R. v. Vaillancourt and R. v. Martineau are early examples of this 
evolving rights approach to the principles of fundamental justice.108 Both 
cases involved challenges to the “constructive murder” provisions of the 
                                                                                                             
106  MVR, supra, note 6, at 503 (citations omitted). 
107  Id. (The principles of fundamental justice “have been recognized as essential elements of 
a system for the administration of justice which is founded upon a belief in the dignity and worth of 
the human person”) (citations omitted).  
108  R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Vaillancourt”]; R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Martineau”]. 
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Criminal Code. Ordinarily, murder requires proof of some kind of subjective 
intent to cause the death of the victim, as reflected in section 229(a) of the 
Criminal Code. The provisions challenged in Vaillancourt and Martineau 
defined homicide as murder in certain circumstances (such as when death 
was caused “while committing or attempting to commit” one of several 
enumerated offences) regardless of whether the Crown could prove the 
subjective mental state. In Vaillancourt, the Supreme Court held that this 
“relaxation” of the mens rea element of murder offended the principles 
of fundamental justice.109  
While Lamer J., writing for the majority, relied on the section 7 right 
to be presumed innocent and the principle that criminal offences must 
contain a fault element,110 it is a stretch to say that the Vaillancourt/ 
Martineau principles can be found in the penumbra of section 7. It is one 
thing to say that a criminal offence must contain a fault element; it is 
something different to say that Parliament cannot reduce the degree of 
fault necessary for a particular offence. Further, Vaillancourt and 
Martineau represented a clear break with a common law tradition. The 
concepts of “constructive murder” or “felony murder” had lengthy 
histories in the criminal law of Canada, the United States, Britain and 
other Commonwealth countries.111 The reasoning in these cases is driven 
by an evolving rights theory focused on human dignity. The Court was 
concerned that those convicted of constructive murder would unduly 
suffer the “stigma” and the severe punishment reserved for the most 
serious offenders. As Lamer C.J.C. wrote, “in a free and democratic 
society that values the autonomy and free will of the individual, the 
stigma and punishment attaching to the most serious of crimes, murder, 
should be reserved for those who choose to intentionally cause death or 
who choose to inflict bodily harm that they know is likely to cause 
death”.112 The Court’s holdings in Vaillancourt and Martineau are rooted 
in the idea that the Constitution protects the human dignity of all 
individuals, including those convicted of serious offences.113  
R. v. Morgentaler is an important case in the development of the 
evolutionary approach to the principles of fundamental justice.114 
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In Morgentaler, the Court famously struck down the Criminal Code’s 
abortion scheme. Chief Justice Dickson found that the legal abortion 
scheme was characterized by excessive delay and that because of 
byzantine procedures, access to therapeutic abortions was illusory.115 
He concluded that this scheme violated the woman’s right to security of 
the person in a manner that offended the principles of fundamental 
justice because the Code’s abortion scheme was “manifestly unfair”.116 
Justice Beetz’s decision was narrower than that of the Chief Justice but 
he ultimately also found that the Code’s therapeutic abortion 
requirements were “manifestly unfair”.117  
Neither Chief Justice Dickson nor Beetz J. provides any authority for 
the proposition that a “manifestly unfair” law offends the principles of 
fundamental justice. The principle that laws should not be “manifestly 
unfair” cannot be traced to our common law heritage, nor does this 
principle fit within the penumbra of section 7. Nevertheless, these 
opinions represent important building blocks in developing the principle 
that laws must not be arbitrary, overbroad or grossly disproportionate 
infringements of life, liberty or security of the person (see infra, at 368-73). 
Justice Wilson’s concurring opinion was not grounded in the 
“manifest unfairness” of the abortion procedure. She affirmed a new 
principle of fundamental justice, anchored in human dignity and 
autonomy, which serves to protect a woman’s substantive right to 
terminate her pregnancy, free from state interference.118 This opinion is 
the high watermark in our third theory of the principles of fundamental 
justice, which focuses on evolving societal values and normative 
judgments about what rights, interests and values should be protected in 
a free and democratic society. 
(b) The Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine Test 
Morgentaler was a watershed moment in part because it recognized 
principles rooted neither in pre-Charter law nor in the section 7 penumbra. 
But the Court discovered early on that this third approach was potentially 
limitless. In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General),119 the Court 
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erected strictures around the evolving rights theory to guard against this risk 
of indeterminacy. Ms. Rodriguez, who suffered from amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis and whose condition was rapidly deteriorating, had applied for a 
court order that section 241(b) of the Criminal Code, which prohibits 
physician-assisted suicide, violated her Charter rights. The appellant argued 
that it is a principle of fundamental justice that the human dignity and 
autonomy of individuals be respected, and that to subject her to needless 
suffering is to rob her of that dignity. A majority of the Court rejected her 
claim. Justice Sopinka held that it was “unquestioned” that “respect for 
human dignity is one of the underlying principles upon which our society is 
based”.120 However, human dignity was not a free-standing principle of 
fundamental justice.121  
In so holding, the majority adopted the following framework to iden-
tify the principles of fundamental justice: 
… A mere common law rule does not suffice to constitute a 
principle of fundamental justice, rather, as the term implies, 
principles upon which there is some consensus that they are vital or 
fundamental to our societal notion of justice are required. Principles 
of fundamental justice must not, however, be so broad as to be no 
more than vague generalizations about what our society considers to 
be ethical or moral. They must be capable of being identified with 
some precision and applied to situations in a manner which yields 
an understandable result. They must also, in my view, be legal 
principles.122 
In R. v. Malmo-Levine, and in cases following it, the Supreme Court 
restated this framework from Rodriguez as a three-part test, requiring the 
rights-holder to establish the following before a court will recognize a 
principle of fundamental justice: 
(1) there is a legal principle; 
(2) there is a societal consensus that the rule or principle is fundamental 
to the way in which the legal system ought to fairly operate; and 
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(3) the principle is capable of being identified with sufficient precision 
so as to yield a manageable standard against which to measure depri-
vations of life, liberty or security of the person.123 
The purpose of the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test was to prevent 
the principles of fundamental justice under the evolving rights 
theory from becoming limitless. Still, even with the adoption of the  
Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test, indeterminacy and unpredictability 
persist, as it remains necessary to identify whether the proposed 
“principle” was in fact a “legal principle”. Further, as commentators have 
noted, determining whether there is “sufficient consensus” that a 
principle is “fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought to 
fairly operate” is even more difficult to understand and apply.124  
Owing to these difficulties, the recognition of new principles of fun-
damental justice under the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test has been 
relatively rare.125 The test is set up for failure. Indeed, where the Court 
has wanted to recognize a right under the evolving rights theory, it has 
tended to bypass the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test altogether in favour 
of a more flexible approach. For example, in United States v. Burns 
(which pre-dates Malmo-Levine but was decided after Rodriguez), the 
Supreme Court held that the extradition of an accused to a death penalty 
jurisdiction would violate the principles of fundamental justice unless 
Canada received assurances that prosecutors would not seek the death 
penalty.126 This holding was not anchored in history or in the section 7 
penumbra or justified under the methodology from Rodriguez. Rather, it 
was based on policy considerations that took into account evolving stan-
dards of decency and the collective abhorrence toward the death penalty 
in Canada and in other democratic nations.127  
The Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. D. (B.)128 stands out as an 
exception in which the application of the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test 
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has led to the recognition of a new principle of fundamental justice under 
the evolving rights approach. In R. v. D. (B.), the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a reverse onus provision of the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act (“YCJA”).129 Justice Abella, writing for the majority, 
recognized a new principle of fundamental justice that young persons 
were entitled to a “presumption of diminished moral culpability” and 
struck down the provision.130 Yet, the majority’s conclusion that there is a 
societal consensus that this principle is fundamental to our legal system 
was based less on democratic consensus and more on the majority’s 
reasoned judgment — taking into account the purposes of the YCJA, 
international human rights norms, and scientific literature about the 
cognitive development of adolescents — that young persons are less 
morally blameworthy than adults.131  
The majority and dissenting opinions in D. (B.) show that there 
remains considerable confusion surrounding the Rodriguez/Malmo-
Levine test, particularly as it relates to the second prong — i.e., a societal 
consensus that the rule or principle is fundamental to the way in which 
the legal system ought to fairly operate. The 5-4 majority in D. (B.) 
understood “societal consensus” to mean what the reasonable person — 
fully informed about our legal system and history and the evolving 
consensus in democratic legal systems around the world and in 
international law — would believe is fundamental to the way in which 
the legal system ought to fairly operate. By contrast, Rothstein J., writing 
for the dissent, took “societal consensus” to mean popular opinion in 
Canada. He wrote that there was “no societal consensus that such a 
presumption [of diminished moral blameworthiness and youth sentences] 
is a vital component of our notion of justice”.132 This conclusion was 
based on “[s]tudies on public perceptions of youth crime”, which 
suggested that “the prevailing views of the public are that youth crime is 
rising, particularly violent youth crime, and that young offenders are 
handled too leniently by youth justice courts”.133 Justice Rothstein went 
on to consider the ebb and flow of youth criminal justice from a 
historical perspective and the perceived public concern with youth 
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violence, which led to successive changes to the Young Offenders Act and 
its eventual repeal in favour of the YCJA.134  
The majority and the dissent in D. (B.) speak past each other. Both 
purport to be applying the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test, but apply 
starkly different versions of the “societal consensus” prong of the test. 
Neither approach is entirely satisfactory. On one hand, the plain meaning 
of the term “societal consensus” would suggest popular opinion as 
reflected in the dissenting approach. On the other hand, how does the 
majority of Canadian society (most of whom are non-lawyers) know 
what is and isn’t a fundamental legal principle? It is doubtful that the vast 
majority of our non-lawyer population has even heard of many of 
those principles that are  well entrenched as section 7 principles of 
fundamental justice. The notion that there is a true democratic 
“consensus” that these principles are fundamental to our legal system is a 
legal fiction. Moreover, the notion that popular opinion should determine 
the content of a constitutional right is oxymoronic. As Lamer J. has 
noted, “[t]he Charter is designed to protect the accused from the 
majority, so the enforcement of the Charter must not be left to that 
majority”.135 From this perspective, an approach to “societal consensus” 
based on what the enlightened, reasonable person would believe is the 
more workable standard. 
Given the relatively few cases in which new principles of fundamen-
tal justice are recognized under the evolving rights theory, it is difficult to 
speculate as to which conception of “societal consensus” will prevail. 
But a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal suggests 
support for the enlightened, reasonable person approach. In Federation 
of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General),136 the Federa-
tion challenged certain Regulations made under the Proceeds of Crime 
(Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act,137 which required  
lawyers in certain circumstances, who receive or pay funds on behalf of 
clients, to keep records of financial transactions. That information can 
then be accessed by Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre 
of Canada (“FINTRAC”) and law enforcement agencies. The chambers 
judge found that this regime engaged the liberty interests of clients and 
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lawyers alike in a manner that was inconsistent with the principles of 
fundamental justice because “the impugned provisions infringe the so-
licitor-client relationship insofar as they provide that lawyers are required 
to obtain and retain information about their clients which can be accessed 
by FINTRAC and provided to law enforcement agencies”, thereby turn-
ing lawyers’ offices “into archives for the use of the prosecution”.138  
The B.C. Court of Appeal upheld the chambers judge’s decision but 
on different grounds. While solicitor-client privilege was of course a 
principle of fundamental justice, it was not directly engaged by this 
legislation. The Court held instead that the regime violated the principle 
of the “independence of the Bar”. The Court of Appeal acknowledged 
that this principle was not a “settled principle of fundamental justice” but 
applied the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine framework and concluded that it 
was “fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to 
operate”.139 The Court gave no pretense of searching for a “societal 
consensus”, but instead focused on the strong language from Supreme 
Court of Canada precedents and a treatise on The Rule of Law that extols 
the virtues of an Independent Bar.140 It will be interesting to see whether 
the Supreme Court adopts the Court of Appeal’s approach, particularly 
because the independence of the Bar may be more appropriately 
categorized as an unwritten constitutional principle (see supra, at 355-56) 
rather than a principle of fundamental justice under section 7.141 
(c)  The Proportionality Triumvirate 
Due in part to the difficulty of establishing new principles under the 
Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test, evolving rights theory cases have tended in 
recent years to coalesce around a set of principles of fundamental justice 
rooted in the concept of proportionality: overbreadth, arbitrariness 
and gross disproportionality (the “proportionality triumvirate”). A law 
is “arbitrary” if it bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the 
state interest that lies behind the legislation.142 A law is “grossly 
disproportionate” if the state action or legislative response to a problem is 
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so extreme as to be disproportionate to any legitimate government 
interest.143 A law is “overbroad” if the means chosen by the State to 
achieve an objective “are broader than necessary to accomplish that 
objective”.144 The concepts of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality closely resemble the three aspects of proportionality in 
the section 1 Oakes test: arbitrariness is analogous to “rational 
connection”; overbreadth is analogous to “minimal impairment”; and gross 
disproportionality is analogous to the weighing of salutary versus 
deleterious effects.145 The proportionality triumvirate’s similarity to the 
Oakes test may explain why courts have been receptive to it and why 
litigants invoking the proportionality triumvirate have achieved some 
success in recent cases. 
The proportionality triumvirate differs from early approaches to the 
evolving rights theory by focusing on the means that the government has 
chosen rather than the ends. Courts are not drawn into making normative 
value determinations about the merits of government policy (e.g., is it 
good policy to protect a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy?) but 
are instead asked to determine whether the government has pursued its 
policy in a proportionate manner (e.g., is the legislation governing abor-
tions fair or arbitrary?). The proportionality triumvirate serves the 
function of the evolving rights theory by expanding section 7 beyond 
historically protected rights and their penumbras, but answers the charge 
of indeterminacy by focusing on the means rather than the ends. 
The origins of the proportionality triumvirate are unclear. They are 
not historical. As noted above, prior to 1982, there was no prohibition 
preventing Parliament or the legislature from passing laws that were 
disproportionate to the life, liberty or security interests affected by the 
legislation. Nor is the principle of proportionate law-making derived 
from the section 7 penumbra because the section 7 penumbra requires a 
close connection to a pre-existing principle. To the extent that the 
proportionality triumvirate fits into any of our categories, it belongs in 
the category of evolving rights based on concepts of human dignity and 
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individual autonomy, having first emerged in Morgentaler under the 
rubric of “manifest unfairness”.146  
Although the Court’s section 7 jurisprudence does not explicitly 
draw the connection between human dignity and proportionality, that 
connection is explained in the section 1 context in R. v. Oakes. In ex-
plaining the rationale behind the section 1 proportionality (“Oakes”) test, 
Dickson C.J.C. explained that:  
… The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a 
free and democratic society which I believe embody, to name but a 
few, respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment 
to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of 
beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and 
political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals 
and groups in society. The underlying values and principles of a free 
and democratic society are the genesis of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which a 
limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be 
reasonable and demonstrably justified.147 
Section 7’s proportionality triumvirate should be understood in a 
similar vein. In the post-Charter era, as citizens grew from subjects into 
constitutionally protected rights-holders, the Constitution now demands 
that the Government treat the people as ends rather than means. Accord-
ingly, government law-making that trenches upon life, liberty or the 
security of the person must be proportionate to the ends sought.  
Efforts to fit section 7 claims within the proportionality triumvirate 
have yielded some success. In Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), a 
4-3 majority struck down Quebec’s prohibition on private insurance for 
health care services as incompatible with the Quebec Charter.148 Three 
members of the majority held that the prohibition was arbitrary and thus 
a violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter because its purpose (the 
protection of the public health care system) bore no relation to the means 
chosen (a prohibition on private insurance).149  
In Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society,150 
the applicants challenged the Minister of Health’s decision to withdraw an 
                                                                                                             
146  See supra, Part II.3(a). 
147  Oakes, supra, note 60, at 136. 
148  Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12. 
149  Chaouilli, supra, note 105, at para. 153. 
150  PHS, supra, note 12. 
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exemption that had been awarded to Insite, a “safe injection site”, under a 
statutory discretion. Insite provided clean needles and a safe environment 
for users of unlawful intravenous drugs, with a view to preventing the 
spread of infectious disease caused by re-use of needles and to providing 
health care for drug users. The evidence in the record showed that Insite 
had reduced the injection of drugs in public as well as the number of 
overdose deaths. Further, there was no evidence that Insite had increased 
the rate of crime. In light of the evidence, the decision to refuse to continue 
Insite’s exemption was arbitrary because the exemption “does not 
undermine the objectives of public health and safety, but furthers them”.151 
The Minister’s action was also grossly disproportionate in its effects. 
Insite’s benefits were proven; it saved lives. On the other hand, the benefit 
that the government might achieve from denying the exemption was 
speculative.152 
Chaoulli and PHS are remarkable for a number of reasons (some of 
which are discussed by my colleagues in this volume).153 But they are 
also remarkable because of what they tell us about the trajectory of the 
evolving rights category of section 7 principles of fundamental justice. 
The evolving rights approach has moved from an individual-centric 
mode of analysis, rooted in human dignity, to a state-centric mode of 
analysis, which focuses on whether the Government has engaged in pro-
portionate law-making. The section 7 claims in Chaoulli and PHS were 
framed as challenges to government conduct: i.e., that the government 
had acted unlawfully by enacting overbroad, arbitrary and grossly dis-
proportionate laws. In the early (pre-Rodriguez) days of the evolving 
rights theory, those claims might have been framed as positive rights 
claims. In an earlier time, the Chaoulli applicants might have focused on 
establishing that the prohibition on private health insurance interfered 
with their right to choose how to access health care — a choice that is 
tied intimately to human dignity and self-fulfilment. Meanwhile, in PHS, 
the claim could have focused on how the government’s conduct interfered 
with the applicant’s right of access to safe conditions, an idea rooted in 
the belief that drug users are also deserving of respect and that safe injec-
tion sites are an important means of protecting them from harm and 
preserving their human dignity. Such claims would have been similar to 
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153  See Alana Klein, “The Arbitrariness in ‘Arbitrariness’ (and Overbreadth and Gross 
Disproportionality): Principle and Democracy in Section 7 of the Charter”, in this volume.  
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other early evolving rights approaches, such as Wilson J.’s concurrence 
in Morgentaler and the dissent in Rodriguez. But in more recent years, 
particularly after the entrenchment of the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test, 
courts have been unreceptive to these affirmative claims grounded ex-
plicitly in human dignity. They have instead found claims couched as 
challenges to government’s overbroad, arbitrary or grossly dispropor-
tionate laws to be more palatable.  
Two “do-over” Charter challenges — Bedford v. Canada154 and 
Carter v. Canada155 — underscore this point. In Bedford, the applicants 
challenged the constitutionality of three provisions of the Criminal Code 
— the bawdy-house prohibition, the “living-off-the-avails” prohibition 
and the public solicitation prohibition — that formed the core of 
Parliament’s response to prostitution.156 These were the same sections 
challenged in the 1988 Prostitution Reference.157 In the Prostitution 
Reference, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the 
Charter challenge.158 The Prostitution Reference arguments in favour of 
striking down the impugned provisions were grounded in the sex 
worker’s right to freedom of expression and the section 7 principle of 
fundamental justice against vague laws. A majority of the Supreme Court 
rejected those claims.159 The Bedford applicants took those arguments 
and recast them as arguments about proportionate law-making, arguing 
that the impugned provisions were overbroad, arbitrary and grossly 
                                                                                                             
154  Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] O.J. No. 1296, 109 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. 
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158  Admittedly, the Charter right primarily at issue in the Prostitution Reference was s. 2(b), 
whereas the focus in Bedford is s. 7. Given that the bulk of the analytical work in both cases is done 
by applying a proportionality test (the s. 1 Oakes test in the Prostitution Reference and gross 
disproportionality and overbreadth as principles of fundamental justice in Bedford), the fact that the 
two cases involved different triggering sections (s. 2(b) versus s. 7) does not undermine the 
comparison. 
159  Prostitution Reference, supra, note 157, at 1143. 
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disproportionate in relation to the ends sought to be achieved through the 
legislation.160 Notwithstanding the Prostitution Reference precedent, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal agreed in part with the application judge and 
held that both the bawdy house and living-off-the-avails provisions were 
overbroad and grossly disproportionate.161  
The British Columbia Supreme Court’s decision in Carter v. Canada 
is another effective illustration of the move from a human dignity-centric 
approach to a state-centric approach grounded in the proportionality tri-
umvirate. Carter is in many respects a do-over of Rodriguez, challenging 
the Criminal Code prohibition on assisted suicide. But whereas the ap-
plicant in Rodriguez grounded her Charter claim in an explicit appeal to 
respect human dignity, the applicant in Carter reframed those arguments 
as claims based in the proportionality triumvirate of the principles of 
fundamental justice.162 Notwithstanding Rodriguez, the British Columbia 
Supreme Court agreed that the impugned provision was overbroad and 
grossly disproportionate to the ends sought.163 The British Columbia 
Court of Appeal recently reversed that decision,164 but a forceful dissent 
from Finch C.J.B.C., and the ongoing public controversy surrounding 
assisted suicide, suggest that the Supreme Court of Canada is likely to 
have the final word in this case. 
Scholars of constitutional law have approached the proportionality 
triumvirate with some suspicion.165 Their concerns are not entirely 
unfounded. While Lamer J. had an expansive vision of the principles of 
fundamental justice, even he cautiously emphasized that the principles of 
fundamental justice must not intrude into the realm of “policy matters”.166 
The argument that the courts applying the proportionality triumvirate are 
not second-guessing Parliament’s policy choices but rather measuring their 
means is only a partial response. As Bedford and Carter show, section 7 
challenges that previously called on the courts to recognize new positive 
section 7 rights can often be reformulated as claims grounded in 
proportionality. The courts’ task will be to separate those genuine 
proportionality-based challenges from those that merely seek to second-
guess the government’s policy decisions. On balance, however, the 
                                                                                                             
160  Bedford, supra, note 154, at paras. 198-212. 
161  Id., at paras. 204-213, 243-256. 
162  Carter, supra, note 155, at paras. 974-985. 
163  Id., at paras. 1371, 1378. 
164  Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] B.C.J. No. 2227 (B.C.C.A.). 
165  Hogg, supra, note 5, at 204-209; Klein, supra, note 2, at 65-72. 
166  MVR, supra, note 6, at 503. 
374 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
emergence of the proportionality triumvirate is a welcome development to 
the evolutionary approach to the principles of fundamental justice, which 
had been rudderless since Rodriguez. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Canada has never expressly adopted any of the 
three theories discussed above, but each has figured prominently in the 
Court’s reasoning throughout the Charter era. Although each of these three 
theories is consistent with the Charter’s transformative purpose, each also 
serves a different function. The historical theory posits that the purpose of 
section 7 is to ensure that the enumeration of certain rights in the text of 
the Charter does not foreclose the recognition of other principles that have 
historically been fundamental to the way our legal system operates. The 
penumbra theory is based on a similar purpose but is more expansive. It 
posits that reliance solely on the historical approach is inconsistent with 
the living tree Constitution that our courts have so assiduously watered and 
would leave gaps in our constitutional framework. The penumbra theory 
thus serves a gap-filling function, recognizing new principles of 
fundamental justice where those new principles are necessary to breathe 
life and meaning into existing principles. The evolving rights theory posits 
that section 7 — like the Charter more generally — serves primarily to 
ensure that the state respects individual human dignity and autonomy. Under 
this theory, the principles of fundamental justice must be moored to their 
primary purpose: protecting the human dignity of Canadian citizens. While 
the evolving rights theory in more recent years has coalesced around the 
proportionality triumvirate of arbitrariness, overbreadth and proportionality, 
these principles remain rooted in the concept of human dignity. 
The purpose of this paper was not to endorse any one of these theo-
ries, but rather to identify them so that they may be helpful to future 
litigants. Understanding the animating principles behind section 7 is nec-
essary to marshal purposive, principled arguments, especially where the 
rights-holder seeks recognition of a new section 7 principle of fundamen-
tal justice. Each of these theories can serve rights-holders’ interests when 
invoked in the appropriate context.  
Rights claimants should not overlook the historical principles of fun-
damental justice. While this category is limited because it depends on 
anchoring the principle in pre-Charter precedent, there is an obvious ad-
vantage if the rights claimant can ground her claim in the historically 
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based principles of fundamental justice: proof of the right’s existence 
requires only identifying a historical precedent. Further, as in the cases 
described above, where a principle of fundamental justice is historically 
based, the rights-holder may be entitled to a more robust remedy.  
The penumbra theory is also a useful tool to litigants because it em-
powers litigants to assert new rights while still being soundly anchored in 
established principles. It was invoked frequently during the 1990s. How-
ever, the failure of the Supreme Court in its early years to more explicitly 
endorse the penumbra theory may have led to some lost opportunities for 
meritorious rights claimants. In cases such as Singh and Sinclair, which 
fit nicely within the penumbra framework, the penumbra mode of analy-
sis was non-existent in the majority’s opinion. If the penumbra theory 
had been expressly endorsed in the Court’s earlier jurisprudence, those 
Charter challenges might have succeeded. Still, the penumbra theory re-
mains promising — particularly in the criminal procedure context where 
it has been most frequently invoked — because it occupies a conceptual 
middle ground: it is dynamic and flexible enough to allow new, previ-
ously unrecognized principles of fundamental justice to emerge but also 
sufficiently anchored to the text of sections 7 to 14 of the Charter to 
avoid the critics’ charge that section 7 after MVR took a vague, indeter-
minate and unprincipled turn. 
The third approach, based on notions of evolving rights and societal 
values, was originally the most expansive approach to the principles of 
fundamental justice. The introduction of the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine 
test has substantially limited the recognition of new principles of funda-
mental justice under this theory. It is hard to see a return to the expansive 
evolving rights approach that we saw in Vaillancourt and Martineau and 
the Rodriguez and Gosselin dissents. In recent years, rights claimants in this 
third category have relied on the proportionality triumvirate — arbitrariness, 
gross disproportionality and overbreadth. In light of the Court’s recent 
decisions in Chaoulli and PHS, and the recent successes in the lower 
courts in Bedford and Carter, litigants seeking recognition of rights 
rooted neither in historical precedent nor the section 7 penumbra would 
be well-advised to focus their efforts on fitting their section 7 Charter 
challenges within the proportionality triumvirate, which appear robust 
enough to accommodate diverse rights claims.  
  
  
